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RECONCILING ENERGY AND FOOD SECURITY
Rhett B. Larson *
INTRODUCTION
Achieving food security and energy security are two primary
policy aims of international and domestic law. Ironically, the pur-
suit of energy security can often frustrate efforts to achieve food
security. Energy security is the condition of a nation and its citi-
zens having reasonable physical and economic access to sufficient
and sustainable energy.' Food security is the condition of a nation
and its citizens having reasonable physical and economic access
to sufficient and sustainable food.2 These two objectives often col-
lide in the area of agricultural water management. It is in that
realm that, frustratingly, the goal of achieving food security most
frequently comes into conflict with the ambition to achieve energy
security.
* Associate Professor of Law, The University of Oklahoma College of Law. M.Sc.,
2011, Oxford University; J.D., 2005, The University of Chicago Law School; B.A., 2002,
Brigham Young University. This article is written as part of the 2013 Allen Chair Sympo-
sium on the Energy-Water Nexus, hosted by the University of Richmond School of Law.
My thanks go to Karen Bradshaw Schulz, Emily Hammond, Troy Rule, Dan Tarlock, Da-
vid Grey, Patricia Wouters, and the panelists, presenters, moderators, participants, and
organizers of the 2013 Allen Chair Symposium.
1. Barry Barton et al., Introduction to ENERGY SECURITY: MANAGING RISK IN A
DYNAMIC LEGAL AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 5 (Barry Barton et al. eds., 2004); see
Wen-chen Shih, Energy Security, GATTIWTO, and Regional Agreements, 49 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 433, 436 (2009) (citing U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & Soc.
AFF., WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL, WORLD ENERGY ASSESSMENT: OVERVIEW 2004 UPDATE, at
42, U.N. Sales No. E.04.III.B.6 (2004), available at http://www.undp.org/content/dam/ap
laws/publication/en/publications/environment-energy/www-ee-library/sustainable-energy/
world-energy-assessment-overview-2004-update/World%20Energy%2OAssessment% 2 00 v
erview-2004%2OUpdate.pdf).
2. See, e.g., Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture, Negotiations on WTO
Agreement on Agriculture: Proposals by India in the Areas of (i) Food Security, (ii) Market
Access, (iii) Domestic Support, and (iv) Export Competition, T 1, G/AG/NG/W/102 (Jan. 15,
2001), available at https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FESearchlDDFDocuments/48712/Q/
G/AGINGW102.pdf.
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For example, food production in India depends heavily upon ir-
rigation.' Many of these crops are drought-resistant grain crops
like sorghum or millet. However, international and domestic en-
ergy demands have rapidly expanded the growth of irrigated sug-
ar cane in India for biofuel production.' Unlike drought resistant
food crops, biofuel crops are often water intensive.' As such, the
desire to achieve energy security diverts available land and water
resources away from food security, exacerbating conflicts between
industries and communities over scarce resources.
This article argues that making "water security" a more pre-
dominant policy aim can help reconcile and integrate energy se-
curity and food security.' Water security is the condition of a na-
tion and its citizens having reasonable physical and economic
access to sufficient and sustainable water, combined with ac-
ceptable levels of water-related risks (e.g., drought, flood, and wa-
ter-related plagues).'
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the wa-
ter/foodlenergy nexus and explains the relationship between wa-
ter, food, and energy security. Water, food, and energy are con-
nected for three important reasons: (1) water and energy are
mutually embedded in each other's production and development,
3. Mohua Guha & Kamla Gupta, Water Resources in India: Critical Issues Related to
Availability and Sustainable Use, 25 IASSI Q. 85, 89-92 (2007).
4. See, e.g., Carl E. Pray et al., Private Research and Public Benefit: The Private Seed
Industry for Sorghum and Pearl Millet in India, 20 RES. POL. 315, 315 (1991).
5. Carey W. King et al., Coherence Between Water and Energy Policies, 53 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 117, 207 (2013).
6. Ethanol can require as much as 200 times the amount of water used to produce an
equivalent amount of petroleum gasoline. Carey W. King & Michael E. Webber, Water In-
tensity of Transportation, 42 ENVTL. Sci. & TECH. 7866, 7869 (2008). A biorefinery that
produces 100 million gallons of ethanol annually uses as much water as a town of five
thousand people. Roberta F. Mann, Like Water for Energy: The Water-Energy Nexus
Through the Lens of Tax Policy, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 505, 521 (2011).
7. Peter G. McCornick et al., Water-Food-Energy-Environment Synergies and
Tradeoffs: Major Issues and Case Studies, 10 WATER & POL'Y 23, 24 (2008 Supp. 1); see
also Shelley Ross Saxer, Managing Water Rights Using Fishing Rights as a Model, 95
MARQ. L. REV. 91, 99 (2011). Disputes over water resources used in energy production ver-
sus food production are often also reflected in political conflicts between urban citizens
and rural citizens. Saxer, supra, at 99. As such, increasing global urbanization can impact
the tension between food and energy security.
8. See generally A. Dan Tarlock & Patricia Wouters, Reframing the Water Security
Dialogue, 20 J. WATER L. 53 (2013) (arguing that a "perfect storm of food, water and ener-
gy shortages" is forming and that these issues require a new dialogue on water security).
9. For a discussion of water security, see generally id.; David Grey & Claudia W.
Sadoff, Sink or Swim? Water Security for Growth and Development, 9 WATER POL'Y 545
(2007).
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and are in turn deeply embedded in food production;o (2) water,
food, and energy are important development markers in evaluat-
ing global and national economic progress;" and (3) water, food,
and energy are important sustainability markers in evaluating
global and national environmental stewardship.12
Part II uses three examples to describe why focusing on energy
security or food security often leads to myopic policies that frus-
trate security aims. The first example describes how the role of
biofuel production in achieving energy security has negative im-
plications for food security, due in large part to water manage-
ment issues. The second example highlights the growing use of
hydraulic fracturing techniques (or "fracking") to produce natural
gas, and how that technology has impacted water availability and
food production. The third example focuses on the use of energy-
intensive desalination to treat rivers to salinity levels appropriate
for food crop irrigation.
Part III explains the water security paradigm and discusses
how this paradigm can reconcile policies that might otherwise
conflict when focused narrowly on food or energy. Part III offers
two examples of how a shift to the water security paradigm could
change the development of natural resource law and policy. The
first possible development is to supplement reliance on carbon
footprint reporting by both states and corporations as an indica-
tor of environmental management with the reporting of water
footprints. The second possible development is to divert subsidies
and environmental liability exemptions away from biofuel pro-
duction and toward policies promoting hydroelectric energy and
dam construction.
10. J.A. Allan, Virtual Water-The Water, Food, and Trade Nexus: Useful Concept or
Misleading Metaphor?, 28 WATER INT'L 4, 9 (2003) [hereinafter Virtual Water-The Water,
Food, and Trade Nexus]; see also J.A. Allan, Virtual Water-Part of an Invisible Synergy
that Ameliorates Water Scarcity, in WATER CRISIS: MYTH OR REALITY 131, 132 (Peter P.
Rogers et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter Virtual Water-Part of an Invisible Synergy] (explain-
ing that virtual water is embedded in commodities like food, energy, and clothing).
11. See Adam Wagstaff & Mariam Claeson, WORLD BANK, THE MILLENNIUM
DEVELOPMENT GOALS FOR HEALTH: RISING TO THE CHALLENGES 8 fig.4 (2004). See general-
ly U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2003, MILLENNIUM
DEVELOPMENT GOALS: A COMPACT AMONG NATIONS TO END HUMAN POVERTY (2003),
available at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/264/hdr_2003_encomplete.pdf.
12. See Wagstaff & Claeson, supra note 11, at 34 tbl.2.1; see also Daniel A. Farber,
Sustainable Consumption, Energy Policy, and Individual Well-Being, 65 VAND. L. REV.
1479, 1522-24 (2012).
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I. THE WATER/FOOD/ENERGY NEXUS
Because of population growth and economic development, the
world will need 50% more food, water, and energy by 2030." The
challenge of providing adequate food, water, and energy for the
world's growing population is aggravated by the advent of global
climate change.14 Addressing this growing demand is the preemi-
nent global challenge of the coming decades, and requires an un-
derstanding of the relationship between water, food, and energy."
Any policy tool aimed at addressing the sustainable and equitable
provision of one of these goods inevitably impacts the sustainabil-
ity and equitable provision of the others." While the relationship
between water, food, and energy is at once both obvious and com-
plex, this part describes three ways in which water, food, and en-
ergy policy intersect.
A. Virtual Water and Embedded Energy in Food Production
First, water and energy are inextricably linked in public policy
debates because each is inherently embedded in the other." Be-
cause water is required to produce virtually all goods, the costs
associated with water development are embedded in all goods, a
13. U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL'S HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON GLOBAL SUSTAINABILITY,
RESILIENT PEOPLE, RESILIENT PLANET: A FUTURE WORTH CHOOSING, at 11, U.N. Sales No.
E.12.1.2 (2012), available at http://www.un.org/gsp/sites/default/files/attachments/GSP
Report -web_final.pdf; see Patricia Wouters et al., Water Security, Hydrosolidarity, and
International Law: A River Runs Through It..., 19 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 97, 98 n.6 (2009)
(citing Christine McGourty, Global Crisis 'to Strike by 2030', BBC NEWS (Mar. 19, 2009),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hiluk-news/7951838.stm (quoting Professor John Bed-
dington, U.K. Government Chief Scientist, who refers to the water stress caused by eco-
nomic development, population growth, and climate change as the "perfect storm" for a
global energy and food crisis)).
14. Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting Water Federalism to Climate Change Impacts: En-
ergy Policy, Food Security, and the Allocation of Water Resources, 5 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. &
POL'Y J. 183, 217 (2010).
15. See Tarlock & Wouters, supra note 8, at 54-55; see also Elizabeth Burleson, Ener-
gy Revolution and Disaster Response in the Face of Climate Change, 22 VILL. ENVTL. L.J.
169, 169 (2011); Jenny Sin-hang Ngai, Energy as a Human Right in Armed Conflict: A
Question of Universal Need, Survival, and Human Dignity, 37 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 579, 580-
81(2012).
16. See Virtual Water-The Water, Food, and Trade Nexus, supra note 10, at 9; see
also Robin Kundis Craig, Hydraulic Fracturing (Fracking), Federalism, and the Water-
Energy Nexus, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 241, 256 (2013).
17. See Christopher A. Scott & Martin J. Pasqualetti, Energy and Water Resources
Scarcity: Critical Infrastructure for Growth and Economic Development in Arizona and
Sonora, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 645, 648 (2010).
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concept called "virtual water."'" The same is certainly true of "vir-
tual energy." In particular, energy and water have virtual ver-
sions of the other embedded in their production, as water treat-
ment and transportation is highly energy-intensive, and the
energy industry is one of the largest water consumers in the
world."9
The water virtually embedded in our food is the amount of wa-
ter needed to produce a given agricultural commodity. 0 For ex-
ample, the production of one kilogram of grain requires approxi-
mately 1000 liters of water.2 1 Virtual water represents a
significant portion (around 15%) of the water used and traded
throughout the world.22 Just as virtual water is embedded and
exported along with food and other agricultural products, virtual
water is embedded in our energy. Water is essential in all parts of
the energy sector: it is used as a reactor coolant, to produce steam
to turn turbines, in oil and gas production, in the growth of biofu-
els, and in the mining of coal, uranium, and minerals used in
components for wind and solar energy sources.23 For example, coal
18. See Virtual Water-The Water, Food, and Trade Nexus, supra note 10, at 5; see
also Shahbaz Khan & Munir A. Hanjra, Footprints of Water and Energy Inputs in Food
Production-Global Perspectives, 34 FOOD POL'Y 130, 131 (2008).
19. See Peter H. Gleick, Water and Energy, 19 ANN. REV. ENERGY & ENV'T 267, 267
(1994).
20. See Virtual Water-Part of an Invisible Synergy, supra note 10, at 135.
21. WORLD WATER COUNCIL, E-CONFERENCE SYNTHESIS: VIRTUAL WATER TRADE-
CONSCIOUS CHOICES 3 (2004), available at http://www.waterfootprint.org/Reports/virtual_
water_finaLsynthesis.pdf; see also A. Y. Hoekstra & A. K. Chapagain, Water Footprints of
Nations: Water Use by People as a Function of Their Consumption Pattern, 21 WATER
RESOURCES MGMT. 35, 38 (2007).
22. A. Y. Hoekstra, Virtual Water Trade Between Nations: A Global Mechanism Affect-
ing Regional Water Systems, IGBP GLOBAL CHANGE NEWS LETTER, June 2003, at 3, avail-
able at http://www.igbp.net/download/18.5831d9adl3275d51cO98000343/1376383092647/N
L54.pdf; Alix Gowlland Gualtieri, Legal Implications of Trade in 7eal' and 'Virtual' Water
Resources 11 (Int'l Envtl. L. Res. Ctr., Working Paper No. 2008-02), available at http://
www.ielrc.org/content/w0802.pdf.
23. Galan-del-Castillo Elena & Velazquez Esther, From Water to Energy: The Virtual
Water Content and Water Footprint of Biofuel Consumption in Spain, 38 ENERGY POLY
1345, 1349 (2010); King et al., supra note 5, at 124-29; M. M. Mekonnen & A. Y. Hoekstra,
The Blue Water Footprint of Electricity from Hydropower, 16 HYDROLOGY & EARTH SYS.
SCI. 179, 179 (2012); Benjamin K. Sovacool, Running on Empty: The Electricity-Water
Nexus and the U.S. Electric Utility Sector, 30 ENERGY L.J. 11, 17 (2009). See generally Da-
vid B. Spence & Emily Hammond Meazell, Fuels for Electric Power Generation: Regulato-
ry, Policy, and Economic Pressures, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAw (Michael
B. Gerrard & Jody Freeman eds., forthcoming 2d ed.); Product Water Footprints-Energy,
WATER FOOTPRINT, http://www.waterfootprint.org/?page=files/Water-energy (last visited
Feb. 18, 2014).
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mining alone uses between fifty and sixty gallons of water for
every ton of coal mined.2 4
While the concept of virtual water has taken hold in academic
literature and policy development, there is no similar discussion
regarding virtual energy. However, the essential attributes of
embeddedness and resource scarcity applicable to water develop-
ment and consumption apply equally to energy development and
consumption. Indeed, just as water is essential, and embedded, in
energy production and generation, energy is equally essential and
embedded in water production and distribution. 25 For example, in
California, potable water treatment and distribution accounts for
an amount of electricity equivalent to one-third of the electricity
used to power all the homes in Southern California.2 ' The energy
required to run a faucet for five minutes is equivalent to the en-
ergy used to power a 60-watt light bulb for fourteen hours.
As water and energy are both embedded in each other, both are
similarly embedded in food. Enormous amounts of energy (and
the water embedded in that energy) are required to transport wa-
ter for irrigation. For example, 85% of electricity on farms is used
to pump water for irrigation." Thereafter, enormous amounts of
energy (and the water embedded in that energy) are required to
transport food.29 As such, any agricultural product (including food
and biofuels) contains significant amounts of both virtual water
and virtual energy.
The concepts of virtual water and energy are also central to
promoting national and international security."o In particular, as
nations with limited energy or water resources forego develop-
ment of those resources and instead rely on imports of virtual wa-
ter and energy from water-rich or energy-rich nations, interna-
24. See Bandana Kaur Malik, Like Water for Energy, and Energy for Water, ENVTL. &
ENERGY STUDY INST. (Aug. 1, 2009), http://www.eesi.org/080109_water._energy.
25. See, e.g., Yuan Zhou & Richard S. J. Tol, Evaluating the Costs of Desalination and
Water Transport, 41 WATER RESOURCES RES., Mar. 2, 2005, at 2, 4, 9.
26. Malik, supra note 24.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Eric Hirst, Food-Related Energy Requirements, 184 SCI. 134, 134 (1974);
Christopher L. Weber & H. Scott Matthews, Food-Miles and the Relative Climate Impacts
of Food Choices in the United States, 42 ENVTL. Scl. & TECH. 3508, 3512 (2008).
30. See, e.g., J. Anthony Allan, 'Virtual Water: A Long Term Solution for Water Short
Middle Eastern Economies? (Univ. of London, Sch. of Oriental & Afr. Studies Water Issues
Study Group, Working Paper, 1997), available at http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/aln02/.
934 [Vol. 48:929
RECONCILING ENERGY AND FOOD SECURITY
tional trade mitigates scarcity concerns that can otherwise erupt
into political instability and violent conflict."
B. Water, Food, and Energy as Development Markers
In addition to virtual water and energy in food, the second way
in which water, food, and energy security intersect is that the
provision of water, food, and energy are important development
markers. The quantity, quality, and scope of available energy and
water are often used as indicators of national economic develop-
ment." The United Nations ("UN") established the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000, which "provide the road map
for reducing poverty and hunger ... and preserving the environ-
ment for future generations."" One of the MDGs included halv-
ing, by 2015, "the proportion of the population without sustaina-
ble access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation [from 1990
levels]."3 Billions of people live without access to adequate water
supplies." Because water treatment and transportation depend so
heavily on energy development, the human health crisis arising
31. See, e.g., Frederick Michael Lorenz, Strategic Water for Iraq: The Need for Plan-
ning and Action, 24 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 275, 278-79 (2008); Jason J. Morrissette & Doug-
las A. Borer, Where Oil and Water Do Mix: Environmental Scarcity and Future Conflict in
the Middle East and North Africa, PARAMETERS, Winter 2004-2005, at 86-87.
32. See, e.g., Daniel D. Bradlow, A Framework for Assessing Global Economic Govern-
ance, 54 B.C. L. REV. 971, 976-77 (2013); see also Declaration on the Right to Develop-
ment, G.A. Res. 41/128, art. 8, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986); United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I),
Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
33. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, WHAT WILL IT TAKE TO ACHIEVE THE MILLENNIUM
DEVELOPMENT GOALS? AN INTERNATIONAL ASSESSMENT vi (2010) (presenting, as "com-
plementary strategies," increasing public investments in infrastructure and increasing
access to water and energy); see United Nations, Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, T
19, U.N. Doc. A/Res/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000); see also Katharine A. Van Tassel & Rose H.
Goldman, The Growing Consumer Exposure to Nanotechnology in Everyday Products:
Regulating Innovative Technologies in Light of Lessons from the Past, 44 CONN. L. REV.
481, 489 n.28 (2011) (noting that the following technology-based advancements would sig-
nificantly advance achievement of MDGs-energy storage, production, and conversion and
water treatment and remediation).
34. U.N. DEP'T OF EcON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS
REPORT 2009, at 45, U.N. Sales No. E.09.I.12 (2009) [hereinafter MILLENNIUM
DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT 2009]; Millennium Declaration, supra note 33, at 19.
35. Malgosia Fitzmaurice, The Human Right to Water, 18 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV.
537, 538 (2007). The World Resources Institute has estimated that 2.3 billion people live
without access to adequate water supplies and 1.1 billion live without safe drinking water.
Id.
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from water stress cannot be addressed without concurrently ad-
dressing access to affordable and sustainable energy.
Just as access to water and energy are essential markers of de-
velopment, access to sufficient food has similarly been relied upon
by international non-governmental organizations and by interna-
tional governance institutions as an indicator of economic devel-
opment." The UN has promulgated MDGs that call for reducing
by half "the proportion of people who suffer from hunger" by
2015." Importantly, because of virtual water and virtual energy
embedded in food, using access to sufficient food as an economic
indicator inherently necessitates consideration of availability and
access to water and energy. Reliance on access to these resources
has become a broadly accepted measure of a nation's economic
development, replacing more narrow conceptions of development.
"[T]he human development approach added value to the conven-
tional economic growth approach by replacing GDP growth with
human development indicators such as the provision of food.""
The challenge of water-related diseases is closely related to en-
ergy and food. Water scarcity impacts food production, with
drought leading to famine and resulting in over three million
child deaths each year from starvation or malnutrition.40 More
than 6000 children die every day due to water-related diarrheal
diseases that aggravate malnutrition and dehydration.4 1 Lack of
adequate energy supplies and infrastructure preclude effective
large-scale water treatment and distribution.4 2 This lack of ade-
quate energy for water treatment and distribution leads to un-
36. Adrian J. Bradbrook et al., A Human Dimension to the Energy Debate: Access to
Modern Energy Services, 26 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 526, 542 (2008); see also
Gleick, supra note 19, at 269-73.
37. Lillian Aponte Miranda, The Role of International Law in Intrastate Natural Re-
source Allocation: Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Peoples-Based Development, 45 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 785, 834 n.204 (2012) (citing MARGOT E. SALOMON & ARGUN SENGUPTA,
THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT: OBLIGATIONS OF STATES AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES
AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 6 (2003)).
38. See MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT 2009, supra note 34, at 11.
39. MARGOT E. SALOMON & ARJUN SENGUPTA, THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT:
OBLIGATIONS OF STATES AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 6
(2003).
40. Nutrition During the First 1,000 Days of Life Crucial for Child Development, 32
ABA CHILD L. PRAC. 113, 126 (2013).
41. Fitzmaurice, supra note 35, at 538.
42. See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACADS., GLOBAL ISSUES IN WATER, SANITATION,
AND HEALTH 2 (2009), available at http://www.ncbi.n1m.nih.gov/books/NBK28462/pdf/
TOC.pdf.
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sanitary conditions and infectious disease outbreaks of water-
related pathogens like cholera, typhoid, and malaria.4 3 Further-
more, lack of energy for water distribution often results in chil-
dren-frequently young girls-being unable to attend school and
exposed to dangerous environments as they devote themselves to
44hauling water from remote wells and rivers.
The importance of food, water, and energy as development
markers is further illustrated by the growing number of voices
arguing for recognition of a human right to food, water, and ener-
gy.45 The interdependent nature of food, water, and energy makes
the promotion of any one as a human right effectively the promo-
tion of all three as human rights. Furthermore, the role climate
change plays in developing policies related to food, water, and en-
ergy invariably ties these human rights arguments to broader is-
sues of sustainability and adaptability." The rhetoric of human
rights has become a central component in legal responses to cli-
mate change and to policy development in the fields of food, wa-
ter, and energy security.47
43. See, e.g., Ellen J. Lee & Kellogg J. Schwab, Deficiencies in Drinking Water Distri-
bution Systems in Developing Countries, 3 J. WATER & HEALTH 109, 112 (2005).
44. JULIE FISHER, WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION COLLABORATIVE COUNCIL, FOR
HER IT'S THE BIG ISSUE: PUTTING WOMEN AT THE CENTRE OF WATER SUPPLY, SANITATION
AND HYGIENE 16 (2006), available at http://www.unwater.org/downloads/evidencereport
eng.pdf.
45. See, e.g., Sin-hang Ngai, supra note 15, at 579, 609 (noting that while access to
water is considered "essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights" and "at
least as important as food," the right to water is "itself dependent upon a right to access to
energy services").
46. See, e.g., Naomi Roht-Arriaza, "First Do No Harm": Human Rights and Efforts to
Combat Climate Change, 38 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 593, 594 (2010); Elise Aiken, Note,
Energy Justice: Achieving Stability in Oil-Producing African Nations, 22 COLO. J. INT'L
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 293, 313 (2011) ("Environmental degradation, poor health, the availa-
bility of fresh water and food, and human rights are all important social issues tied to pov-
erty that achieving energy justice could help alleviate.").
47. The Human Right to Water and Sanitation, G.A. Res. 64/292, U.N. Doc.
A/641L.63/Rev.1, 2-3 (July 26, 2010) [hereinafter 2010 Resolution on the Human Right to
Water and Sanitation]; Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Substantive Issues Aris-
ing in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: General Comment No. 15, 28, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinaf-
ter Comment 15]. Comment 15 states that the right to water "clearly falls within the cate-
gory of guarantees essential for securing an adequate standard of living" guaranteed un-
der the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Comment 15,
supra at 1 3; see International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 11
1, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
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C. Water, Food, and Energy as Sustainability Markers
The third way that water, food, and energy intersect is the role
each plays as a marker of global and national sustainability.8
Sustainability means the ability of current populations to meet
their needs without threatening the ability of future generations
to meet their needs at a standard of living comparable to those of
current populations.4 ' Governments, international governance in-
stitutions, and non-profit governmental organizations often use
physical and economic access to food, water, and energy as mark-
ers of environmental stewardship and sustainable resource man-
agement at the corporate, national, and global level.o
The interdependent nature of food, water, and energy-as each
is embedded in the other-makes the sustainability of one an is-
sue of the sustainability of the others. Water scarcity affects the
availability of food and energy, and energy scarcity impacts the
availability of food and clean water." As such, the interconnect-
edness of food, water, and energy through the "virtual water" and
"virtual energy" concepts also impacts their respective and rela-
tive sustainability.
Furthermore, the sustainability nexus has a strong relation-
ship to the role of food, water, and energy as development mark-
ers. As noted above, one of the legal developments arising from
the role that food, water, and energy play as development mark-
ers is the growing call to recognize each as a human right." To
48. See William H.L. Stafford & Alan Brent, Bioenergy Systems Sustainability As-
sessment and Management, 3 RENEWABLE ENERGY L. & POL'Y REV. 205, 205 (2011).
49. U.N. Environmental Programme, Report of the World Commission on Environ-
ment and Development, Our Common Future, 14th Sess., June 8-19, 1987, at 54 1 1, U.N.
Doc. A/42/427; see Rio Declaration, supra note 32, at Principle 3.
50. See, e.g., MARTIN C. HELLER & GREGORY A. KEOLEIAN, LIFE CYCLE-BASED
SUSTAINABILITY INDICATORS FOR ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. FOOD SYSTEM 7 (2000); Sara
Dillon, A Farewell to 'Linkage" International Trade Law and Global Sustainability Indi-
cators, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 87, 98 (2002).
51. See, e.g., King et al., supra note 5, at 135; Margaret Sova McCabe & Joanne
Burke, The New England Food System in 2060: Envisioning Tomorrow's Policy Through
Today's Assessments, 65 ME. L. REV. 549, 574-75 (2013).
52. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Substantive Issues Arising in the Imple-
mentation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: General
Comment No. 12, T 1, U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999); Fitzmaurice, supra note 35,
at 537; Peter Gleick, The Human Right to Water, 1 WATER POL'Y 487, 488-89 (1999); Ste-
phen C. McCaffrey, A Human Right to Water: Domestic and International Implications, 5
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1992); Anna F.S. Russell, International Organizations and
Human Rights: Realizing, Resisting or Repackaging the Right to Water?, 9 J. OF HUM. RTS.
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the extent that a human right to food, energy, or water guaran-
tees provision of those goods for free, or at a substantially reduced
(and heavily subsidized) cost, such a human right threatens sus-
tainability, because consumers of food, water, and energy do not
fully internalize the costs of their consumption and have little in-
centive to conserve." As food, water, and energy depend upon ex-
haustible natural resources, policies should encourage conserva-
tion of those resources through consumer's cost-internalization.5 4
For example, South Africa was the first nation to recognize a
constitutionally guaranteed right to food and water." Under Sec-
tion 27 of the South African Constitution, "[e]veryone has the
right to have access to . . . sufficient food and water."" To satisfy
the requirements of this right, the city of Johannesburg provided
unlimited water to residents at a flat rate. This approach, how-
ever, proved unsustainable. Johannesburg delivered one-third of
its total water provided to Soweto, but Soweto generated only 1%
of Johannesburg's revenue for water services."
The Johannesburg example raises an important point regard-
ing sustainability. In the case of Johannesburg, the underlying
exhaustible resource-water-was being consumed at an unsus-
tainable rate. However, too often sustainability is framed narrow-
1, 3 (2010); Stephen R. Tully, The Contribution of Human Rights to Universal Energy Ac-
cess, 4 NW. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 518, 525 (2006).
53. See Rhett B. Larson, The New Right in Water, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181, 2228
(2013); see also David Zetland, Water Rights and Human Rights: The Poor Will Not Need
Our Charity if We Need Their Water 6 (Prop. & Env't Research Ctr., Working Paper, Aug.
11, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract~id=1549570 (com-
paring data on water access before and after enactment of a constitutional right to water
in twelve countries, with data from twelve countries lacking a constitutional right to water
and finding no impact on improved water access arising from enactment of a constitution-
al right to water).
54. King et al., supra note 5, at 118.
55. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 ch. 2, § 27; see also Andrew L. Magaziner, The Trickle Down
Effect: The Phiri Water Rights Application and Evaluating, Understanding, and Enforcing
the South African Constitutional Right to Water, 33 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 509, 510
(2008).
56. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 ch. 2, § 27.
57. Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC) at 1 11 (S. Afr.), avail-
able at http://www.saflii.org/zalcases/ZACC/2009/28.pdf.
58. Id. at 12 (noting that "the rate of payment of municipal water bills was less than
10%); COALITION AGAINST WATER PRIVATISATION ET AL., THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SILENT
DISCONNECTIONS: PREPAID METERS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR LIFE IN PHIRI, SOWETO 6
(2004), http://www.citizen.org/documents/Phiri.pdf (noting that the lack of cost recovery
for water services in Phiri was a major contributing factor to Johannesburg's decision to
explore new methods for water distribution in Soweto); see also Larson, supra note 53, at
2211.
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ly in terms of conservation of natural resources. In the case of
food, water, and energy, resource sustainability is closely related
to economic sustainability.5 9 Water treatment and distribution
and energy generation and transmission are both extremely capi-
tal-intensive industries.60 The infrastructure necessary to gener-
ate and transmit electricity and to treat and transport water re-
quires significant investments that necessitate full-cost recovery
in order to maintain infrastructure, credit-worthiness, and at-
tract capital.6' A human rights approach to energy and water,
therefore, frustrates economic sustainability when it interferes
with full cost recovery.
Additionally, distribution of water and transmission of electric-
ity typically involve natural monopolies.62 As such, regulatory
rate-setting is typically employed to avoid monopolistic pricing."
Combining guaranteed provision of energy or water in connection
with a human right, with centralized rate-setting powers, raises
the potential for large general subsidies to energy and water sec-
tors due to political pressure to keep rates low.64 Low rates result
59. See RESILIENT PEOPLE, RESILIENT PLANET, supra note 13, at 11.
60. See, e.g., John Briscoe, The Financing of Hydropower, Irrigation and Water Supply
Infrastructure in Developing Countries, 15 WATER RESOURCES DEV. 459, 460, 462 (1999);
Klaus W. Grewlich, International Regulatory Governance of the Caspian Pipeline Policy
Game, 29 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 87, 106 (2011); Camille Pannu, Drinking Water
and Exclusion: A Case Study from Calif. Central Valley, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 223, 237, 268
(2012).
61. See, e.g., Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944)
(noting that cost-recovery "should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integ-
rity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital"); see also Jersey
Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 730 F.2d 816, 818 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
62. Bruce Pardy, The Dark Irony of International Water Rights, 28 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 907, 918 (2011); David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 765, 767-68 (2008). Natural monopolies occur when a single firm is able
to provide a good or service to a market at a lower average cost than multiple firms be-
cause of large economies of scale or network economies. See WILLIAM W. SHARKEY, THE
THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY 54-55 (1982). Economies of scale occur when the average
cost of production declines over the entire range of production for the industry. Daniel F.
Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Access to Networks: Economic and Constitutional Connec-
tions, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 885, 915 (2003). Network economies occur when a single firm is
able to more efficiently operate than multiple firms because it is better able to coordinate
interdependent aspects of an industry's operations or because it is able to process infor-
mation more efficiently. See id. at 914-16.
63. See Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 595, 600-01; see also Bluefield Water Works &
Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679, 683, 690 (1923); see also George L.
Priest, The Origins of Utility Regulation and the 'Theories of Regulation" Debate, 36 J.L. &
ECON. 289, 295-96 (1993).
64. See MICHAEL J. ROUSE, INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION OF WATER
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in cost-externalization by consumers, and no incentive to con-
serve energy or water.65 The subsidies and low rates are then
passed on to food, because water and energy are embedded in
their virtual forms. Technological innovation, increasing reliance
on renewable energy, and distributed generation could change the
economics of food, water, and energy provision, eliminating some
of the concerns associated with capital-intensive natural monopo-
1*66lies.6
II. THE CONFLICTING AIMS OF FOOD AND ENERGY SECURITY
As discussed above, it is often impossible to address food, wa-
ter, or energy independently. They are inherently intertwined be-
cause of the virtual nature of water and energy, and the role wa-
ter, food, and energy play as indicators of economic development
and sustainability. The failure to integrate food, water, and ener-
gy policies, by narrowly considering each separately, often results
in inconsistent measures that enhance security of one at the ex-
pense of the others. This part provides three examples of how the
failure to integrate food, water, and energy policies often aggra-
vates development and sustainability challenges.
SERVICES: THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS 38, 40-41, 45, 47, 135 (2007).
65. See Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization, 83 TEx. L. REV.
1873, 1882-84 (2005) (arguing that generally subsidizing water leads to inefficient water
use); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Water as a Public Commodity, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 17, 24-25
(2011) (noting efforts to charge "the full cost of delivered water" and trends towards im-
proved water valuation). See generally NORMAN MYERS & JENNIFER KENT, PERVERSE
SUBSIDIES: How TAX DOLLARS CAN UNDERCUT THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE ECONOMY
(2001) (discussing the negative effects of general subsidies on water management and oth-
er sectors).
66. Gary H. Wolff et al., Private Sector Participation in Water Services: Through the
Lens of Stockton, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1323, 1341 (2006). As they relate to energy, the first
and third assertions (capital intensity and natural monopolies) have been true for most of
modern history. See Spence, supra note 62, at 767. However, these assertions for energy
may become increasingly inapplicable as "distributed energy sources" (photovoltaic solar
cells and small wind turbines) become increasingly accessible and viable. See, e.g., Patrick
Parenteau & Abigail Barnes, A Bridge Too Far: Building Off-Ramps on the Shale Gas Su-
perhighway, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 325, 349-52 (2013); Matt Rivera & John Roach, Out of
Darkness: Solar Power Sheds a Little Light on Powerless Communities, NBC NEWS (Aug.
11, 2013, 5:12 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/out-darkness-solar-power-sheds-
little-light-powerless-communities-6C10867721 (describing the increasing use of solar
panels to provide evening light to families in the Navajo nation and in rural areas of Afri-
ca).
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A. Biofuel Production, Water Management, and Food Security
One obvious way in which food, water, and energy policies in-
tersect is in the production of biofuels. Arable land formerly used
to produce food is often converted into energy crops (usually corn,
palm oil, soy, or sugar cane) used to produce bioethanol or bio-
diesel." Because biofuels are renewable energy sources with a
relatively low carbon footprint, biofuel production forms an im-
portant part of the energy security policies of many nations.6 s
However, biofuel production raises significant food and water
security issues. The conversion of food crops to energy crops re-
duces the food supply and increases food prices, and it impacts
water management, as drought-resistant, water-efficient food
crops are replaced with drought-sensitive, water-intensive energy
crops." China and India, the world's two largest producers-and
consumers-of many agricultural goods, already face serious wa-
ter-related limitations on agricultural production." Yet both na-
tions have initiated programs to increase biofuel production and
exports, often by converting water-efficient food crops, like millet
and sorghum, to water-intensive energy crops such as palm oil.'
Production of soy-based biofuels can consume more water per unit
of energy than conventional petroleum production and refining."
Nonetheless, increasing demand for biofuels has led Argentina to
shift from food production to soy production for biodiesel with
67. See Arthur J. Ragauskas et al., The Path Forward for Biofuels and Biomaterials,
311 SCI. 484, 487-88 (2006).
68. Id. at 484.
69. See, e.g., High-Level Conference on World Food Security: The Challenges of Cli-
mate Change and Bioenergy, June 3-5, 2008, Soaring Food Prices: Facts, Perspectives,
Impacts and Actions Required, 9, 19-24, U.N. Doc. HLC/08flNF/1 (Apr. 2008) [herein-
after Soaring Food Prices]; see also Steven Sexton et al., Food Versus Fuel: How Biofuels
Make Food More Costly and Gasoline Cheaper, AGRIC. & RESOURCE EcoN. UPDATE, Sept.-
Oct. 2008, at 1-2.
70. Charlotte de Fraiture et al., Biofuels and Implications for Agricultural Water Use:
Blue Impacts of Green Energy, 10 WATER POL'Y 67, 68, 71 (2008 Supp. 1); see U.S. INT'L
TRADE COMM'N, PUBLICATION No. 4219, CHINA'S AGRICULTURAL TRADE: COMPETITIVE
CONDITIONS AND EFFECTS ON U.S. EXPERTS xv (2011); India: Issues and Priorities for Agri-
culture, WORLD BANK (May 17, 2012), http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2012/05
/17/india-agriculture-issues-priorities.
71. See de Fraiture et al., supra note 70, at 68, 70-71.
72. Shannon L. Ferrell et al., The Future of Agricultural Law: A Generational Shift,
18 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 107, 127 (2013); see also DIANA GLASSMAN ET AL., WORLD POL'Y
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significant environmental impacts." Brazil has become one of the
world's largest producers and exporters of water-intensive, sugar
cane-based biofuels-but at a huge ecological cost." Brazil's grow-
ing biofuel industry has accelerated deforestation, which causes
increased nutrient and organic pollution to rivers from agricul-
tural runoff."
In the case of biofuels, energy security is perhaps too often giv-
en precedence over food security. In exchange for domestically
grown, renewable energy or the economic advantages of exporting
in-demand biofuel products, many nations sacrifice sustainable
food production. Exports of biofuels effectively export water sup-
plies in the form of virtual water. The result is often not only wa-
ter scarcity and contamination, but rising food prices.76 Spikes in
food prices are a common source of political instability, as evi-
denced by the role of food costs in the recent "Arab Spring" upris-
ings in the Middle East and North Africa."
B. Hydraulic Fracturing, Water Management, and Food Security
Biofuels are not the only energy crop presenting challenges to
water management in emerging countries. Some farmers, for ex-
ample, grow crops that support hydraulic fracturing in natural
gas production." Fracking involves the injection of fluids into the
substratum, which fractures shale formations and releases oth-
erwise inaccessible natural gas." The United States has vast nat-
73. Julia Tomei & Paul Upham, Argentinean Soy-Based Biodiesel: An Introduction to
Production and Impacts, 37 ENERGY POL'Y 3890, 3891, 3895 (2009).
74. Jos6 Goldemberg, Suani Teixeira Coelho & Patricia Guardabassi, The Sustainabil-
ity of Ethanol Production from Sugarcane, 36 ENERGY PoL'Y 2086, 2091 (2008).
75. Id.
76. See Fuel Subsidies: Is There an Impact on Food Supply and Prices?: Hearing Be-
fore the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 110th Cong. 12-13 (2008)
(testimony of Mark W. Rosegrant, Ph.D., Director, Env't & Prod. Tech. Div., Int'l Food Pol-
icy Research Inst.); Soaring Food Prices, supra note 69, at 9, 19-24; Amela Ajanovic,
Biofuels Versus Food Production: Does Biofuels Production Increase Food Prices?, 36
ENERGY 2070, 2074 (2011); Donald Mitchell, A Note on Rising Food Prices 4 (The World
Bank Dev. Prospects Grp., Policy Research Working Paper No. 4682, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1233058.
77. See, e.g., Sarah Johnstone & Jeffrey Mazo, Global Warming and the Arab Spring,
in THE ARAB SPRING AND CLIMATE CHANGE 15, 15-17 (2013); George Joff6, The Arab
Spring in North Africa: Origins and Prospects, 16 J. N. AFR. STuD. 507, 510 (2011).
78. Gardiner Harris, In Tiny Bean, India's Dirt-Poor Farmers Strike Gas-Drilling
Gold, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2012, at Al.
79. See Dianne Rahm, Regulating Hydraulic Fracturing in Shale Gas Plays: The Case
of Texas, 39 ENERGY POL'Y 2974, 2974 (2011).
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ural gas reserves in shale formations, and that natural gas burns
cleaner, with lower greenhouse gas emissions than coal or petro-
leum."o Electric generation using natural gas also avoids the regu-
latory and ecological miasma associated with coal ash waste dis-
posal." As a result, natural gas lies at the heart of the United
States' energy security policy.8 2 Fracking is also a growing natural
gas exploration technique in many parts of the world."
Fracking is, by itself, typically an extremely water-intensive
form of hydrocarbon production. Fracking at a single well site
can require as much as thirteen million gallons of water." Addi-
tionally, fracking, like biofuel production, has water quality im-
plications just as significant as its water supply implications.
Fracking fluid often contains hazardous substances, including
benzene and formaldehyde." While injectate into shale for-
mations likely does not impact underground sources of drinking
water, fault drilling or well installation can result in groundwater
contamination."
Fracking, however, raises many of the same food security is-
sues as biofuel production. Fracking fluid frequently contains an
emulsifier produced from the seed of the guar plant." The rapid
expansion of fracking in the United States and other countries
has resulted in a rising demand for guar, with the international
80. Id.; see also James M. Inhofe & Frank Fannon, Energy and the Environment: The
Future of Natural Gas in America, 26 ENERGY L.J. 349, 352 (2005).
81. See Spence & Hammond Meazell, supra note 23, at 4, 26, 36 (discussing the envi-
ronmental benefits of electric generation using natural gas).
82. See Inhofe & Fannon, supra note 80, at 350, 388 (discussing the need to balance
environmental and energy concerns).
83. See Jonathan A. Lesser, Energy and the Environment: A Fractured Europe De-
bates Fracking, 29 NAT. GAS & ELECTRICITY 31, 31 (2013).
84. See Kundis Craig, supra note 16, at 252-54.
85. HEATHER COOLEY & KRISTINA DONNELLY, PAC. INST., HYDRAULIC FRACTURING
AND WATER RESOURCES: SEPARATING THE FRACK FROM THE FICTION 15 (2012), available at
http://www.pacinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/full report35.pdf.
86. ROBERT B. JACKSON ET AL., CTR. ON GLOBAL CHANGE, RESEARCH AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HYDRAULIC FRACTURING AND SHALE-GAS EXTRACTION 3 (2011);
Chris Mooney, The Truth About Fracking, 305 SCI. AM. 80, 84 (2011), available at http://
www.nature.com/scientificamerican/journal/v305/n5/full/scientificamerican111-80.html.
87. Mooney, supra note 86, at 84; see also David C. Holzman, Methane Found in Well
Water Near Fracking Sites, 119 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A289, A289 (2011), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmdarticles/PMC3222989/.
88. Ahmad Bahamdan, Hydrophobic Guar Gum Derivatives Prepared by Controlled
Grafting Processes for Hydraulic Fracturing Applications, 4-6 (Aug. 2005) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University), available at http://etd.1su.edu/docs/availa
ble/etd-06022005-225849/.
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price of guar seed rising from $4 per kilogram to $30 per kilogram
in an eighteen-month period." Thousands of acres of crops for-
merly used for food production have been converted to the pro-
duction of guar in India and Pakistan." As with palm oil and sug-
ar cane, guar may be a less drought-resilient and more water-
intensive crop than many of the food crops it replaces."
Conversion of land from food to energy production has far-
reaching impacts on water management. This conversion often
precludes the use of efficient irrigation techniques. For example,
water-efficient irrigation techniques, like the use of drip irriga-
tion or center-pivot irrigation, are often appropriate for food
crops, but inappropriate for the biofuel crops that replace them."
From pollution to food price increases, the transition from
growing food to "growing" energy presents serious challenges to
food security and water management. Where this transition in-
creases water consumption and the export of virtual water, ener-
gy crop production aggravates water-related conflicts. Such con-
flicts arise as increased water demand strains legal and
regulatory regimes aimed at mediating or resolving disputes over
shared and scarce water resources. Furthermore, converting land
to growing water-intensive energy crops makes the population
more vulnerable to drought conditions, which are likely to become
increasingly common in many parts of the world as a result of
global climate change."
89. Hilary Hylton, Why the U.S. Fracking Industry Worries About the Weather in In-
dia, TIME (July 17, 2012), http://world.time.com/2012/07/17/why-the-u-s-fracking-industry-
worries-about-the-weather-in-india/.
90. Id.
91. Compare W.L. Alexander, D.A. Bucks & R.A. Backhaus, Irrigation Water Man-
agement for Guar Seed Production, 80 AGRONOMY J. 447, 447-53 (1988) (describing irri-
gated water amounts necessary for guar seed production), with M.O.A. Fawusi & A.A.
Agboola, Soil Moisture Requirements for Germination of Sorghum, Millet, Tomato, and
Celosia, 72 AGRONOMY J. 353, 353-57 (1980) (describing irrigated water amounts neces-
sary for sorghum and millet).
92. Kenneth G. Cassman, Ecological Intensification of Agriculture and Implications
for Improved Water and Nutrient Management, in FERTIGATION PROCEEDINGS: SELECTED
PAPERS AT THE JOINT INTERNATIONAL SYMPOsIUM ON FERTIGATION 23, 29, 32 (Patricia
Imas ed., 2005), available at http://www.ipipotash.org/en/publications/detail.php?i=269.
93. See, e.g., Cynthia Rosenzweig et al., Climate Change and Extreme Weather
Events-Implications for Food Production, Plant Diseases, and Pests, 2 GLOBAL CHANGE &
HuM. HEALTH 90, 90, 102 (2001).
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C. Desalination, Irrigation, and Energy Security
Energy and crop irrigation are invariably connected; not only
as water is increasingly used to irrigate energy crops like guar,
but also through the energy required to treat contaminated wa-
ter, or develop new water supplies, for irrigation purposes. One
particularly energy-intensive means of increasing the availability
of irrigation water is the use of desalination." Desalination can
represent the sacrifice of energy security in the name of food se-
curity, and it can also provide a locus for disputes over shared
95
water resources.
For example, the apportionment of water from the Colorado
River and the river's water quality have long been sources of dis-
pute between the United States and Mexico.96 Increasing crop ir-
rigation within the Colorado River Basin has resulted in contam-
ination of the river from significant runoff containing fertilizer
salts." The salinity levels at the headwaters of the Colorado are
less than fifty parts per million ("ppm")." But because of irriga-
tion runoff, the Colorado River crosses the United States/Mexico
border with salinity at an environmentally toxic level exceeding
1200 ppm.99
The elevated salinity of the Colorado River has caused signifi-
cant diplomatic issues between the United States and Mexico be-
cause of damage from saline-contaminated waters used to irrigate
crops in northern Mexico.'o This challenge is aggravated during
94. See Sabine Lattemann & Thomas Hopner, Environmental Impact and Impact As-
sessment of Seawater Desalination, 220 DESALINATION 1, 10 (2008); see also G.L. Meerganz
von Medeazza, 'Direct' and Socially-Induced Environmental Impacts of Desalination, 185
DESALINATION 57, 61 (2005).
95. See Rhett B. Larson, Innovation and International Commons: The Case of Desali-
nation Under International Law, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 759, 761-62, 764-66 (2012).
96. See Robert W. Adler, Restoring the Environment and Restoring Democracy: Les-
sons from the Colorado River, 25 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 55, 81 (2007). See generally Jennifer Pitt
et al., Two Nations, One River: Managing Ecosystem Conservation in the Colorado River
Delta, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 819, 833-34, 836-41 (2000).
97. See Edward Lohman, Yuma Desalting Plant: 2003, SOUTHWEST HYDROLOGY,
May/June 2003, at 20.
98. Id.
99. See id.
100. See Herbert Brownell & Samuel D. Eaton, The Colorado River Salinity Problem
with Mexico, 69 Am. J. INT'L L. 255, 255-56 (1975); see also Lynne Lewis Bennett, The In-
tegration of Water Quality into Transboundary Allocation Agreements: Lessons from the
Southwestern United States, 24 AGRIC. ECON. 113, 120-21 (2000) (noting that saline water
has caused damage to more than 63% of crops in northern Mexico that rely on Colorado
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drought conditions when there is less water to dilute salt concen-
trations, as illustrated during the extreme drought of the early
1960s when salinity levels in the Colorado River at the United
States/Mexico border reached 2500 ppm, with devastating im-
pacts to Mexican farmers in the basin.0 ' Mexico formally protest-
ed the United States' upstream management of salinity levels,
arguing that those levels made the water unusable and thus con-
stituted a violation of the United States' obligations under the
1944 Rivers Treaty.o2
In an effort to resolve the dispute, the United States agreed to
maintain the salinity levels of the Colorado River at the Mexican
border at just over the salinity levels behind the United States
Imperial Dam on the Colorado River.' 3 To maintain this salinity
level, Congress passed the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control
Act, authorizing the construction (at a cost of $245 million in
1974) and operation of a desalination plant in Yuma, Arizona for
the express purpose of lowering the salinity levels in the Colora-
do.104
However, operation of the Yuma desalination plant has been
sporadic, largely because of the energy expenses associated with
operating the plant.'a Unlike fracking or biofuel production,
where energy security is implemented in a way inconsistent with
food security, the Yuma desalination plant implements an ener-
gy-intensive technology for the purpose of protecting food-
producing crops. In each instance, however, water quality is
threatened. Just as fracking fluid can contaminate groundwater,
River water for irrigation, with annual damages to farmers reaching in excess of $300 mil-
lion per year); Francisco Oyarzabal-Tamargo & Robert A. Young, International External
Diseconomies: The Colorado River Salinity Problem in Mexico, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 77,
88 (1978).
101. Bennett, supra note 100, at 121.
102. See Treaty Between the United States of America and Mexico Respecting Utiliza-
tion of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers of the Rio Grande, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 3,
1944, 59 Stat. 1219 [hereinafter 1944 Rivers Treaty]; see also Brownell & Eaton, supra
note 100, at 256. The treaty imposes an obligation on the United States to deliver a certain
quantity, but not necessarily a certain quality, of Colorado River water at the border. See
1944 Rivers Treaty, supra, art. 10(a), 59 Stat. at 1237.
103. See 1944 Rivers Treaty, supra note 102, arts. 12(d) & 15, 59 Stat. at 1241; Inter-
national Boundary and Water Comm'n, Minute 242, Aug. 30, 1973, available at http://
www.ibwc.gov/Treaties_- MinutesfMinutes.html.
104. Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act, Pub. L. No. 93-320, 88 Stat 266, 269-
70 (1974).
105. See Lohman, supra note 97, at 21; see also TAYLOR 0. MILLER ET AL., THE SALTY
COLORADO 75 (1986).
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and runoff and erosion from biofuel production can contaminate
rivers, the disposal of brine wastes from desalination plants can
have significant environmental impacts.'06
The point of friction, therefore, between policies aimed at
achieving energy security and those aimed at food security is of-
ten management of both water quantity and water quality. To
harmonize these two policy aims, and avoid resource-related con-
flicts and human health problems, the security paradigm must
shift away from food and energy, and toward water security.
III. WATER SECURITY AS AN INTEGRATED POLICY PARADIGM
As discussed above, the failure to integrate energy security and
food security presents difficult policy choices and often puts these
policy aims at odds. However, policies implemented to achieve
food or energy security need not be inconsistent. The point at
which food security and energy security often intersect is water
management.o' Therefore, water security can effectively integrate
both food and energy security. This part first describes what the
water security paradigm is, and then discusses two ways in which
shifting to a water security paradigm would harmonize the often
discordant relationship between food security and energy securi-
ty.
A. Defining the Water Security Paradigm
The water security paradigm integrates much of food security
and energy security because managing water inherently manages
food and energy, given the degree to which virtual water is em-
bedded in both. However, despite the fact that the water security
paradigm integrates much of food and energy security, it is never-
theless different from both forms of security in fundamental and
important ways.
106. See Nicos X. Tsiourtis, Desalination and the Environment, 141 DESALINATION 223,
228-33 (2001); see also Hisham M. Ettouney et al., Evaluating the Economics of Desalina-
tion, CHEMICAL ENGINEERING PROGRESS, Dec. 2002, at 32, 33-34.
107. Of course, food and energy security interests compete in other ways as well, in-
cluding land use, government spending, investments in research and development, and for
political attention. See generally Robert H. Abrams & Noah D. Hall, Framing Water Policy
in a Carbon Affected and Carbon Constrained Environment, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 3
(2010); Petra Hellegers et al., Interactions Between Water, Energy, Food and Environment:
Evolving Perspectives and Policy Issues, 10 WATER POL'Y 1 (2008 Supp. 1).
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First, water is inherently different than food and energy be-
cause only water is water. This means that, while there are many
kinds of food and many sources of energy, there is no substitute
for water."o' While diversification of food production or energy
sources is an important component of food and energy security,
there is no diversification option in water law.
Second, water has a unique socio-cultural role.' Uranium and
natural gas are rarely if ever used in religious ceremonies, and
you do not see children playing during the summer by squirting
each other with petroleum or in the winter by throwing coal. The
unique socio-cultural role of water often impacts its value and
pricing as an economic good and commodity-because it falls for
free out of the sky and runs freely in rivers, and because it is so
intertwined with culture through recreation and religion, water is
often undervalued."0
Third, food security and energy security are primarily con-
cerned with adequacy of provision-getting enough of both to eve-
ryone. Indeed, the central concern of food and energy security is
how to manage scarcity."' Water security, on the other hand, is as
much about managing excess as it is about managing scarcity."2
Too much water (floods) can be catastrophic, and too much water
in the wrong place, or with elevated concentrations of the wrong
constituents (toxins or pathogens), can be equally catastrophic."'
The water security paradigm moves water to center stage as
the one resource that is embedded in the production and distribu-
tion of all others."' The water security paradigm encourages
states to pursue alternative sources of energy and food for which
108. See, e.g., JOHN P. SMoL, POLLUTION OF LAKES AND RIVERS: A
PALEOENVIRONMENTAL PERSPECTIVE 1 (2d ed. 2008).
109. See generally Rhett B. Larson, Water, Worship, and Wisdom: Indigenous Tradi-
tional Ecological Knowledge and the Human Right to Water, 19 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L.
43 (2012); Rhett B. Larson, Holy Water and Human Rights: Indigenous Peoples' Religious-
Rights Claims to Water Resources, 2 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 81 (2011).
110. See Larson, supra note 53, at 2220-21.
111. See, e.g., CLAIRE SCHAFFNIT-CHATTERJEE, THE GLOBAL FOOD EQUATION: FOOD
SECURITY IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF INCREASING SCARCITY 4 (Stefan Schneider ed., 2009);
Mary Jane Angelo, Corn, Carbon, and Conservation: Rethinking U.S. Agricultural Policy
in a Changing Global Environment, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 593, 594-95 (2010); S. Scott
Gaille, Allocation of International Petroleum Licenses to National Oil Companies: Insights
from the Coase Theorem, 31 ENERGY L.J. 111, 114 (2010).
112. See Grey & Sadoff, supra note 9, at 558.
113. Id. at 547, 560.
114. Id. at 546-47.
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they have a comparative advantage in production, rather than
risk their own water security in an attempt to secure food and
energy security. For example, water-poor states will seek to de-
velop water-efficient food products and import water-intensive
food products (like rice), which effectively imports virtual water."'
Additionally, the water security paradigm deals frankly with
water as a market commodity."' Undervalued water, whether for
sociocultural reasons or political reasons, presents the greatest
threat to conservation and sustainable food and energy produc-
tion."' The water security paradigm requires that water consum-
ers internalize the costs of their water consumption, which will
require agriculture and energy-the two largest water consum-
ers-to move toward water-efficient means of production and dis-
tribution.
At first glance, full cost recovery and effective pricing of water
services can appear regressive and to possess disproportionate
impact on the poor. However, large general subsidies to the water
sector typically benefit the energy and agricultural industries the
most, because they are the largest water consumers."' Further-
more, in developing countries, the rich are typically those con-
nected to a treated water distribution system, and thus benefit
from water subsidies."' The poor often obtain water either from
remote, contaminated sources or buy water from water vendors at
a cost twenty-five times more than the rates paid by those con-
nected to the system.'2 0 Rather than large general subsidies that
benefit the agricultural and energy industries, directed subsidies
to indigent water consumers (something akin to food stamps) paid
115. See A.Y. Hoekstra & P.Q. Hung, Globalisation of Water Resources: International
Virtual Water Flows in Relation to Crop Trade, 15 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 45, 46 (2005);
M. Dinesh Kumar & O.P. Singh, Virtual Water in Global Food and Water Policy Making:
Is There a Need for Rethinking?, 19 WATER RESOURCES MGMT. 759, 763 (2005).
116. See Saxer, supra note 7, at 96 (noting that "[t]he price that water districts pay for
water should reflect the uncertainty of the resource from year to year, as well as the need
to support the infrastructure necessary to deliver the water that is available for alloca-
tion").
117. See, e.g., Janet E. McKinnon, Water to Waste: Irrational Decisionmaking in the
American West, 10 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 503, 508 (1986); see also Nels Johnson et al.,
Managing Water for People and Nature, 292 Sci. 1071, 1072 (2001).
118. Larson, supra note 53, at 2231-32; see also S. Sharma, Water Markets Exclude the
Poor, in THE VALUE OF NATURE-ECOLOGICAL POLITICS IN INDIA 142 (S. Kothari et al.
eds., 2003); ROUSE, supra note 64, at 45-47.
119. See ROUSE, supra note 64, at 45, 47.
120. Id. at 47.
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for by increased block-tariffs (i.e., water rates that increase on
consumption increases) facilitate equitable distribution of water,
full cost recovery, and water conservation in the energy and agri-
cultural sectors.12 1 Remaining in an energy security or food securi-
ty paradigm could aggravate issues of conservation and equity by
retaining large general water subsidies for irrigation and power
generation.
The water security paradigm not only integrates the scarcity
concerns driving food and energy security, it also integrates the
productive and destructive power of water. Droughts have obvi-
ous impacts on food and energy security. However, floods have
similar impacts in their disruption of roads, transmission lines,
crops, and other critical infrastructure.12  Such impacts range
from flooded dirt roads that prevent rural crops from reaching the
market, to the ecological disaster at Fukushima's nuclear power
plant in the wake of a major typhoon.' This integration is essen-
tial because water variability is the most critical issue arising
from global climate change, and the most important part of cli-
mate change adaptation is resiliency to water variability in ener-
gy and food production.'24
A move toward the water security paradigm will influence how
law and policy is developed with respect to food and energy. Be-
cause water is so highly embedded in both food and energy, the
water security paradigm presents opportunities to harmonize the
otherwise often discordant aims of policies aimed at food and en-
ergy security. At the same time it addresses the challenges pre-
sented by both droughts and floods."' While shifting to a water
121. See id. at 47, 49; see also GABRIEL A. BITRAN & EDUARDO P. VALENZUELA, WATER
SERVICES IN CHILE: COMPARING PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PERFORMANCE 3 (2003), available at
http://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/11303/261260viewpoint.pdf?;
D. Whittington, Municipal Water Pricing and Tariff Design: A Reform Agenda for South
Asia, 5 WATER POL'Y 61, 71-72 (2003).
122. See Grey & Sadoff, supra note 9, at 551, 560.
123. See, e.g., Lincoln L. Davies, Beyond Fukushima- Disasters, Nuclear Energy, and
Energy Law, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1937, 1942-43 (2011); Carlo Del Ninno et al., Public Poli-
cy, Markets and Household Coping Strategies in Bangladesh: Avoiding a Food Security
Crisis Following the 1998 Floods, 31 WORLD DEV. 1221, 1222 (2003).
124. See Lenny Bernstein et al., Synthesis Report, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUPS I, II, AND III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF
THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 50-52 (2007); Charles J. Vo-
rosmarty et al., Global Water Resources: Vulnerability from Climate Change and Popula-
tion Growth, 289 SCl. 284-87 (2000). See generally Barry Smit et al., An Anatomy of Adap-
tation to Climate Change and Variability, 45 CLIMACTIC CHANGE 223 (2000).
125. See Grey & Sadoff, supra note 9, at 547, 560.
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security paradigm could have far-reaching legal and policy impli-
cations, this part presents two possible implications of the para-
digm shift for reconciling food and energy security.
B. From Reporting Carbon Footprints to Reporting Water
Footprints
The first possible implication of a shift to the water security
paradigm is to supplement reliance on carbon footprints as the
main indicia of environmental stewardship with greater reliance
on water footprints. Because of the role greenhouse gas emissions
play in climate change, monitoring, reporting, and reducing those
emissions (particularly in the form of carbon dioxide equivalent
[CO2e]) has played a central role in the mitigation of anthropo-
genic climate change.126 By extension, the measuring, reporting,
and reducing of "carbon footprints" (or the amount of CO2e emit-
ted to produce a given product or provide a given service) has be-
come the aim of policymakers and the sine qua non of good envi-
ronmental stewardship.127 The centrality of carbon footprints has
been one of the major policy features of both food and energy se-
curity."'
Focus on carbon footprints, however, is narrow and fails to in-
tegrate other aspects of sustainability. Carbon footprints often do
not integrate the environmental concerns associated with low-
carbon energy sources, like nuclear energy, solar and wind ener-
gy, or biofuels.'" Arguably, carbon footprints do not fully inte-
grate the environmental impacts of industries associated with
power generation, like mining or oil and gas exploration and ex-
traction, including fracking."' Carbon footprints also fail to in-
clude the environmental impacts of climate change mitigation
126. See, e.g., Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tai-
loring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,516 (June 3, 2010) (codified in various sections at 40
C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, and 71); Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change arts. 3, 7 & 8, opened for signature Mar. 16, 1998, 2303 U.N.T.S.
162.
127. See, e.g., Christopher L. Weber & H. Scott Matthews, Quantifying the Global and
Distributional Aspects of American Household Carbon Footprint, 66 ECOLOGIcAL EcoN.
379, 380, 387 (2008).
128. See, e.g., Mark Harvey & Sarah Pilgrim, The New Competition for Land: Food,
Energy, and Climate Change, 36 FOOD POL'Y 540, 541 (2011).
129. Alexis Laurent et al., Limitations of Carbon Footprint as Indicator of Environmen-
tal Sustainability, 46 ENvrL. Scl. & TECH. 4100, 4105-06 (2012).
130. Id.
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measures, like geologic carbon sequestration, "green" building
codes, smart grids, or hybrid cars.13 1
For example, a state seeks to implement policies to reduce its
carbon footprint. It replaces one coal-fired power plant with a nu-
clear power plant, photovoltaic solar cell arrays, and a wind farm.
The state retrofits another coal-fired power plant to operate on
natural gas (which emits less carbon than coal), and engages in
geologic carbon sequestration to mitigate the emissions from its
use of natural gas. It passes a green building code to improve en-
ergy efficiency and decrease energy consumption, and provides
subsidies to encourage the purchase of hybrid cars or cars using
biofuels. These efforts would likely significantly reduce the state's
carbon footprint.'32
But that reduction would tell the state little of the environmen-
tal impacts from all of the mining of silicon, copper, gold, tung-
sten, and other minerals to build the components of solar cells,
wind turbines, "green" buildings, hybrid cars, or smart grids.'3 3 It
would tell the state little of the water used as a reactor coolant in
the nuclear power plant, to grow biofuels, or used in the fracking
operations to provide natural gas.134 It would tell the state little of
the impacts of nuclear waste disposal. 3 It would tell the state lit-
tle of possible contamination of groundwater from geologic carbon
*136
sequestration.
131. See, e.g., Adam Harmes, The Limits of Carbon Disclosure: Theorizing the Business
Case for Investor Environmentalism, 11 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 98 (2011); Sarah E. Light,
NEPA's Footprint: Information Disclosure as a Quasi-Carbon Tax on Agencies, 87 TUL. L.
REV. 511, 564 (2013); Michael P. Vandenbergh & Mark A. Cohen, Climate Change Gov-
ernance: Boundaries and Leakage, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 221, 271 (2010).
132. See generally Committee Report, Report of the Legislation Committee, 33 ENERGY
L.J. 617 (2012); Marc B. Mihaly, Recovery of a Lost Decade (or is it Three?): Developing the
Capacity in Government Necessary to Reduce Carbon Emissions and Administer Energy
Markets, 88 OR. L. REV. 405 (2009).
133. See, e.g., RESNICK INST., CRITICAL MATERIALS FOR SUSTAINABLE ENERGY
APPLICATIONS 4 (Neil Fromer, Roderick G. Eggert & Jack Lifton eds., 2011); Laurent et
al., supra note 129, at 4104-06.
134. Cf. P.W. Gerbens-Leenes et al., The Water Footprint from Biomass: A Quantitative
Assessment and Consequences of an Increasing Share of Bio-Energy in Energy Supply, 68
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1052, 1058 (2009) (comparing the water footprint through the energy
supply chain for several sources, including coal, natural gas, uranium, solar, and wind).
135. See generally Alex Funk & Benjamin K Sovacool, Wasted Opportunities: Resolving
the Impasse in United States Nuclear Waste Policy, 34 ENERGY L.J. 113 (2013).
136. Cf. Elizabeth J. Wilson, Regulating the Ultimate Sink: Managing the Risks of Geo-
logic CO, Storage, 37 ENvTL. ScI. & TECH. 3476, 3476-77 (2003) (describing potential risks
associated with geologic carbon sequestration, including contamination of subsurface wa-
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If the state relied on water footprints as an additional measure
of environmental performance, it would have a clearer picture of
the overall environmental impacts of its policies.' Because of the
water embedded in energy production, the water footprint would
capture many of the same environmental issues as those captured
by the carbon footprint."' And the water footprint would also in-
corporate other environmental impacts. For example, accounting
for the virtual water embedded in the natural gas produced
through fracking and used in the generation of nuclear energy
would tell us more about the environmental impacts and sustain-
ability of natural gas and nuclear power.139 The virtual water em-
bedded in minerals mined to support renewable energy and used
to grow biofuels would provide more information on the sustaina-
bility of those policies.o Water contaminated through mining,
nuclear waste disposal, deforestation to support biofuel produc-
tion, or geologic carbon sequestration would similarly provide in-
formation on environmental impacts not otherwise captured by
the carbon footprint. 4'
The water security paradigm would establish effective monitor-
ing and reporting of water footprints-incorporating virtual wa-
ter up through the chain of production and transfer-as the new
sine qua non of integrated and transparent reporting of environ-
mental stewardship and sustainability. Because of the water em-
bedded in energy, and particularly when combined with reporting
carbon footprints, the water footprint would still capture impacts
ters).
137. See, e.g., A.K. Chapagain & S. Orr, An Improved Water Footprint Methodology
Linking Global Consumption to Local Water Resources: A Case of Spanish Tomatoes, 90 J.
ENVTL. MGMT. 1219, 1227 (2009).
138. Cf Virtual Water-The Water, Food, and Trade Nexus, supra note 10, at 5 ("Vir-
tual water is the water needed to produce agricultural commodities. The concept could be
expanded to include the water needed to produce non-agricultural commodities."). The wa-
ter footprint links production impacts-environmental, economic, and political-with the
"consumption base." Chapagain & Orr, supra note 137, at 1219; Virtual Water-The Wa-
ter, Food, and Trade Nexus, supra note 10, at 5.
139. See King et al., supra note 5, at 118-19; Sovacool, supra note 23, at 17.
140. Gerbens-Leenes et al., supra note 134, at 1052.
141. See FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., THE STATE OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 64 (2008); Gerald
F. Hess, Hanford: Cleaning Up the Most Contaminated Place in the United States, 38 ARIZ.
L. REV. 165, 179, 180 (1996); John F. Seymour, Hardrock Mining and the Environment:
Issues of Federal Enforcement and Liability, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 795, 821-23 (2004); Wilson,
supra note 136, at 3476-77; cf. A. B. Kersting et al., Migration of Plutonium in Ground
Water at the Nevada Test Site, 397 NATURE 56, 59 (1999) (concluding that models only ac-
counting for "sorption and solubility" may underestimate the ability of plutonium to mi-
grate in groundwater).
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of carbon emissions on global climate change and encourage en-
ergy conservation and climate change mitigation measures.'4 2 The
water footprint would also provide necessary information on sus-
tainability issues arising from increased consumption attributa-
ble to population growth and economic development."' Further-
more, water footprints would provide a better understanding of
how countries could face water insecurity through virtual water
exports. For example, guar production may improve energy secu-
rity in nations with fracking operations and may frustrate food
security in nations replacing food crops with guar. The water
footprint will capture this tension, but will also provide necessary
information on whether guar exports have the net effect of
achieving water security in one nation at the expense of water se-
curity in another.
C. Water Security, Dams, and Hydroelectric Energy
In addition to placing water footprint monitoring and reporting
at the center of sustainability policies, the water security para-
digm could also change attitudes about the role of dams in socie-
ty. Dams are the paradigmatic example of the food, water, and
energy nexus.
Imagine a society with widespread adult illiteracy, thousands
of deaths each year from malaria and floods, most living on sub-
sistence farming, and a life expectancy of fifty-three years. This
may sound like an impoverished nation, but this in fact describes
Tennessee in the early 1930s before the construction of forty-two
large dams comprising the Tennessee Valley Authority ("TVA").144
The dams provided electricity that promoted industry, safety, ed-
ucation, and efficiency in that region.'4 ' The dams provided water
storage for times of drought and flood control mechanisms.4 6 TVA
142. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
143. A. Ertug Ercin & Arjen Y. Hoekstra, Water Footprint Scenarios for 2050: A Global
Analysis, 64 ENV'T INT'L 71, 71-72 (2014).
144. See Grey & Sadoff, supra note 9, at 553; see also W.J. Cosgrove, Water for Growth
and Security, in WATER CRISIS: MYTH OR REALITY 40 (Peter P. Rogers et al. eds., 2006).
145. See generally WORLD BANK, TECHNICAL PAPER No. 416, COMPREHENSIVE RIVER
BASIN DEVELOPMENT: THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY (Barbara A. Miller & Richard
B. Reidinger eds., 1998).
146. See id. at 43-44, 52, 58-59.
2014] 955
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
transformed the region from one hampered by its hydrology to
one that had harnessed its hydrology. 4 1
The development of large dams has fallen into disfavor in many
policy circles, for understandable and compelling reasons." Large
dams are expensive to build, maintain, and operate, can have
devastating effects on a watershed's ecology, can displace com-
munities, and can result in catastrophic failures."' However, one
potential advantage of a shift to the water security paradigm will
be a more considerate approach to balancing the obvious and se-
rious costs of large dams against their equally obvious and signif-
icant benefits.' France, one of the lowest carbon-emitting devel-
oped countries in the world, has achieved a low-carbon energy
industry by developing 97% of its hydroelectric capacity, with a
total capacity of 26,000 MW from hydroelectric power.' Compare
that to Africa, which has greater hydroelectric potential than Eu-
rope, but has developed only 5% of that potential.152 In the Colo-
rado River Basin in the United States Sonoran Desert, the river
has about 1400 days of storage behind dams, allowing these arid
regions to irrigate crops and feed livestock even during prolonged
droughts."' Compare that to the Indus River in South Asia, which
has only thirty days of storage, despite supporting huge popula-
tions with high water variability.'5 4 In North America, dams have
over 6000 m per capita of reservoir capacity to respond to floods,
while Ethiopia and Morocco have less than 40 m and 550 m' per
capita, despite being wracked by floods.'"'
The aims of food security are to secure consistent and predicta-
ble production of crops and livestock resilient to drought condi-
tions."' The aims of energy security are to secure a sustainable,
renewable, and low-carbon source of predictable and consistent
147. See id. at 7; Grey & Sadoff, supra note 9, at 553.
148. See WORLD COMM'N ON DAMS, DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR
DECISION-MAKING 15-17 (2000) (providing an overview of the problems associated with
large dams).
149. Id. at 15-17, 39; see also PATRICK MCCULLY, SILENCED RIVERS: THE ECOLOGY AND
POLITICS OF LARGE DAMS 24-31, 42 (1996).
150. See Grey & Sadoff, supra note 9, at 564.
151. Id. at 554.
152. Id. at 554-55 & fig.4.
153. Id. at 553.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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energy.17 These aims are furthered by the development of large
dams. However, despite the security synergies inherent in large
dam construction, there has been a decreasing social and political
acceptance of large dams for the reasons discussed above. A shift
to the water security paradigm would reemphasize the benefits of
large dam development, because it would integrate the productive
capacity of water with storage concerns inherent in food security,
the renewable, low-carbon power concerns in energy security, and
it would introduce considerations of flood control and the destruc-
tive capacity of water.
CONCLUSION
The water security paradigm focuses on achieving a sustaina-
ble quantity and quality of water, thereby maximizing the con-
structive power of water to develop food and energy, while mini-
mizing the destructive power of water in instances of drought,
flood, and plague. Moving to a water security paradigm is funda-
mentally about achieving equitable resource distribution, because
the poor suffer disproportionately from both droughts and
floods.' Indeed, water presents something of a "chicken or egg"
challenge to development. Is it the hydrologic condition of a state
or region that determines its political and economic stability, or
does economic and political stability allow states and regions to
overcome their hydrologic condition? Put another way: Are
droughts and floods caused by nature, or by the failure of society
to adapt to nature? On the one hand, many countries with "diffi-
cult hydrologic legacies" (i.e., areas with absolute water scarcity
like deserts or low-lying regions with seasonal heavy rainfalls)
typically deal with political and economic instability, arguably at-
tributable to "bad hydrology."" On the other hand, as noted
above, in the Tennessee Valley (an area with a difficult hydrologic
legacy of floods) and in other areas of absolute water scarcity (like
the Australian Outback or the Sonoran Desert in the Southwest-
157. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., Enrique R. Carrasco & Alison K. Guernsey, The World Bank's Inspection
Panel: Promoting True Accountability Through Arbitration, 41 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 577,
586 (2008); Robert R.M. Verchick, Disaster Justice: The Geography of Human Capability,
23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 23, 42-43 (2012).
159. See Tarlock & Wouters, supra note 8, at 53, 56; see also Grey & Sadoff, supra note
9, at 569 ("Water security has always been a societal priority-in its absence people and
economies have remained vulnerable and poor.").
2014] 957
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
ern United States), political and economic stability has allowed
states to overcome the bounds placed on them by their otherwise
difficult hydrologic legacies. In a sense, political and economic
stability have allowed states to simulate the conditions of good
hydrology.
Thus, the tension created by water insecurity may not neces-
sarily be conflict over shared, scarce resources, but instead may
be managing the migration pattern that has typified human his-
tory and pre-history-people move to follow water. Today, we see
this pattern as large groups of immigrants leave areas of water
insecurity (either because of a difficult hydrologic legacy or be-
cause of a society's failure to adapt) to areas of water security (ei-
ther because of a good hydrologic legacy or an effective simulation
of that legacy due to political and economic stability). The great-
est investment nations can make in managing immigration will
be to achieve global water security.
That achievement is elusive, not only because of the "chicken or
egg" relationship between water and development, but because it
may be difficult to know when water security is achieved. A cen-
tral question at the heart of food, water, and energy security is:
"How much"? With water, the answer cannot be "enough to stay
alive." There are only two kinds of people on earth-people with
enough water to stay alive and dead people. Every living person
on earth has access to at least some water. The real question of
security is: "How much to achieve what standard of living"? The
water security paradigm has the potential to integrate and har-
monize security aims in both food and energy, but still must an-
swer this fundamental question. Despite the need to answer fun-
damental questions of measuring outcomes, the water security
paradigm will play an important role in guiding how law and pol-
icy reconcile the challenges of providing sustainable food and en-
ergy to a growing population in the face of climate change.
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